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The Brilliant Career of  
Section 7 of the Charter 
Peter W. Hogg* 
I. SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER 
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 provides 
as follows: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF SECTION 7 
A brilliant career usually starts with humble origins, and that was 
certainly the case with section 7.2 It was born in 1982, along with the rest 
of the Charter, and the framers made two decisions that were intended to 
ensure that its life would be uneventful and unimportant, even poverty 
stricken. Their model was the due process clause which is to be found in 
each of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the 
United States and which guarantees against the deprivation of “life, 
liberty and property, without due process of law”. But the framers of the 
Charter dropped the reference to “property” from section 7 so as to 
greatly reduce the class of governmental acts to which section 7 would 
apply. The replacement phrase in section 7, namely, “security of the 
person”, is — at least in the realm of governmental policies — a much 
                                                                                                             
* C.C., Q.C., Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University; Scholar in 
Residence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. I am grateful to Professors Hamish Stewart, 
Jamie Cameron and Sonia Lawrence, who read and commented on an earlier draft and made 
suggestions for its improvement. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 This paper draws heavily from Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (annually supplemented), ch. 47, “Fundamental Justice” [hereinafter 
“Hogg”]. I am also indebted to Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) 
[hereinafter “Stewart”]. 
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narrower category than property. And the framers of section 7 replaced 
“due process of law” with “the principles of fundamental justice”, which 
they believed would provide only procedural protections to life, liberty 
and security of the person, in contrast to the “substantive due process” 
jurisprudence that had developed in the United States around the due 
process clauses.3 Both of these changes were intended to reduce the 
scope of judicial review under section 7, eliminating judicial protection 
of property rights, and restricting judicial protection of life, liberty and 
the security of the person to the requirements of a fair procedure.4 
These efforts to stunt the growth of section 7 were partly successful. 
The omission of property rights has been respected by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. This has meant that section 7 does not provide any 
procedural protection against the taking of property by government and 
no requirement of fair compensation — matters which in practice are not 
of great significance since they are usually well protected by statute. Of 
more significance, section 7 also has nothing to say about the myriad of 
statutes that affect only economic interests, because the courts have been 
careful to interpret “liberty” as excluding economic liberty, not wanting 
to admit property by the back door when it was shut out of the front. For 
this reason, section 7 does not apply to civil proceedings where only 
money is at stake. However, “liberty” still has a long reach, because it 
obviously includes imprisonment,5 and this sweeps into its purview much 
of the Criminal Code6 and other federal criminal statutes and even some 
regulatory statutes (provincial as well as federal), on the basis that a 
potential sentence of imprisonment is a deprivation of liberty. For this 
reason, section 7 has many applications to criminal proceedings. There is 
no reason to doubt that these interpretations accord with the intention of 
the framers. 
                                                                                                             
3 Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 47.10(a); Stewart, supra, note 2, at 98-99.  
4 The Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, the statutory precursor of the Charter 
(which applied only to federal laws) was also a model for the framers of the Charter; by s. 2(e) it 
supplied (in a procedural context) the phrase “the principles of fundamental justice”, and in s. 1(a) it 
guaranteed “security of the person”, but it went on to follow the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
in guaranteeing “enjoyment of property”, and “the right not to be deprived thereof except by due 
process of law”. These provisions remain in place for federal but not provincial laws. 
5 “Liberty” has usually been interpreted as physical liberty, and most of the cases exempli-
fy physical liberty (liability to imprisonment being the most common hook into s. 7), but there is a 
strand of jurisprudence, starting with Wilson J. in R. v. Morgentaler, infra, note 10, which expands 
the concept into the liberty to make “fundamental personal choices”, which was accepted by the 
majority in Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 
2 S.C.R. 307, at paras. 49, 54 (S.C.C.). 
6 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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III. PROCEDURAL SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE AND ABORTION 
Nor should it be assumed that procedural fundamental justice is un-
important, even considering that there are specific procedural guarantees 
of criminal justice in section 11 of the Charter.7 The right of an accused 
person to silence is not guaranteed by section 11, but the Supreme Court 
has held that it is guaranteed by section 7.8 And the right to a fair trial, 
which is guaranteed by section 11, is given a broader application by 
section 7, because section 7 is not restricted to criminal proceedings 
against “any person charged with an offence” (section 11), but includes 
civil and administrative proceedings where they affect life, liberty or 
security of the person: proceedings for child protection, extradition and 
security certificates are examples.9 Indeed, the most famous application 
of section 7, which was to invalidate the legal restrictions on abortion, 
was based primarily on procedural defects in the law that was struck 
down. 
The abortion case was R. v. Morgentaler (No. 2),10 where the Supreme 
Court, by a 5-2 majority, struck down the provisions of the Criminal 
Code that made abortion a criminal act unless the procedure was ap-
proved by a “therapeutic abortion committee” of an approved hospital. 
The evidence showed that the requirement of approval by a therapeutic 
abortion committee restricted access to the procedure (because some 
hospitals would not set up the required committees), and caused delays in 
treatment, which increased the risk to the health of the woman. All five 
majority judges agreed that the risk to health that was increased by the 
law was a deprivation of security of the person. The breach of fundamen-
tal justice consisted (for four of the majority judges) in the unnecessarily 
restrictive procedural requirements for a therapeutic abortion11 and (for 
one of the majority judges, Wilson J.) in the deprivation of the woman’s 
                                                                                                             
7 Procedural fairness as a principle of fundamental justice occupies a long chapter 5 in 
Stewart, supra, note 2. 
8 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.); and see Hogg, supra, 
note 2, at s. 47.20 for a full discussion. 
9 For example, New Brunswick v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) 
(child protection); United States of America v. Cobb, [2001] S.C.J. No. 20, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587 
(S.C.C.) (extradition); Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2007] 
S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) (security certificate). 
10 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morgentaler”]. 
11 The reasoning of the majority judges is not totally clear on this point. Stewart, supra, note 
2, at 140, takes the view that the majority was implicitly invoking a notion of arbitrariness — a 
substantive principle. 
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freedom of conscience. Since this decision, abortion has been unregu-
lated in Canada.12 
But the intention of the framers to restrict judicial review under 
section 7 to matters of procedure has been totally disregarded by the 
Supreme Court of Canada with the dramatic consequences that will be 
related in this paper. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE  
AND THE FAULT PRINCIPLE 
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2)13 is the 
case that decided that fundamental justice was not restricted to proce-
dure. At issue was a provision in British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act 
that made it an offence to drive a car while prohibited from driving or 
while one’s driving licence was suspended. The Act was a deprivation of 
liberty because it imposed a penalty of imprisonment on anyone found 
guilty of the offence. The controversial provision was a subsection that 
declared that the offence was one of “absolute liability” in which “guilt is 
established by proof of driving, whether or not the defendant knew of the 
prohibition or suspension”. The Court held that it was a breach of 
fundamental justice to impose a term of imprisonment for an offence that 
lacked the element of mens rea (a guilty mind). The Court made no 
attempt to characterize this as a procedural defect in the law; the absence 
of mens rea as an element of the offence was not an issue of procedure, 
but a substantive injustice. Section 7 prohibited substantive as well as 
procedural injustice. 
Justice Lamer, who wrote the principal opinion of the Court, did not 
ignore the legislative history of section 7. The Minister of Justice and the 
other officials who were responsible for drafting section 7 had testified 
before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Com-
mons on the Constitution (1980-1981), had explained the concerns about 
substantive due process in the United States, and had asserted that 
“fundamental justice”, unlike “due process”, was a purely procedural 
concept.14 Justice Lamer considered this evidence, but he described it as 
                                                                                                             
12 Infra, note 59. 
13 [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Reference”]. Justice Lamer wrote for a majority of four. Justices McIntyre and Wilson each wrote 
concurring opinions. All seven judges were unanimous in ruling that fundamental justice extended to 
substantive as well as procedural justice. 
14 Supra, note 3. 
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being “of minimal weight”. In his view, the words “fundamental justice” 
did not have a settled interpretation, and could be interpreted as extend-
ing to substantive injustice. And that was the preferable interpretation in 
the context of section 7 because it would provide stronger protection to 
life, liberty and security of the person.15 He might have added that the 
distinction between substantive and procedural injustice would inevitably 
have become a vexed and ongoing source of litigation. Perhaps these 
points were strong enough to overcome the clear legislative history — at 
least for those of us who are not originalists.16 But the effect of the 
decision, as I will show, was to expand greatly the scope of judicial 
review under section 7. 
V. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
If fundamental justice was now substantive and not merely proce-
dural, what was its definition? Justice Lamer in the B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Reference refused to offer any kind of exhaustive definition, but he said 
that “the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic 
tenets of the legal system”.17 It was hard to square this with the actual 
decision in the case since he never explained why absolute liability, 
which had long been a familiar (if unloved) part of Canada’s system of 
criminal justice, was now contrary to the basic tenets of the legal system. 
Moreover, it turned out that, even in the Criminal Code itself, mens rea 
was by no means an essential element of every offence, and the Supreme 
Court was readily persuaded to strike down (or redraft) a number of 
offences. For example, statutory rape (intercourse by a man with an 
underage girl) was modified to require that the accused was aware of the 
age of his victim;18 and the felony-murder rule (a death caused in the 
course of another crime is murder) was struck down,19 as was the 
Criminal Code definition of a “party” to an offence which could lead to 
the conviction for murder of a participant in an unlawful enterprise (like 
                                                                                                             
15 Id., at 504-505. 
16 Stewart, supra, note 2, at 310, points out that the case being one of first impression “any 
answer the Court gave would be an answer chosen by the Court”. That is true, although “the 
interpretation proposed by the civil servants” (his phrase) was the interpretation offered to the 
Special Joint Committee reviewing the draft Charter and seems to have been accepted by the 
legislative committee which neither demurred nor proposed any change in s. 7. 
17 Id., at 503. 
18 R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.). 
19 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
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a robbery) who did not kill, and did not intend to kill the victim.20 These 
were offences with long pedigrees in Canada and elsewhere in the 
common law world, but they were now contrary to the basic tenets of the 
legal system. 
Even where the mental element of crime was the issue, the Court still 
had enormous difficulty in teasing out the implications for a wide variety 
of offences.21 Where the mental element of crime was not the issue, the 
B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference left the Court completely at sea. The crime 
of assisting suicide (another offence with a long history, albeit an unusual 
offence in that the victim actively consents) was upheld by a narrow 4-3 
margin, with majority and minority proposing radically different tests for 
a breach of fundamental justice.22 Another crime that causes no obvious 
harm to others is that of possession of marijuana, and that was also 
upheld by the Court — but by an 8-1 majority: the Court held that a 
“harm principle” was not a principle of fundamental justice.23 
In the marijuana case, Malmo-Levine, the majority gave a definition 
of fundamental justice as its reason for decision,24 and this one seems to 
have stuck — at least for the nine years up until the time of writing 
(2012). The majority postulated three requirements for a rule to qualify 
as a basic tenet of the justice system and to qualify as a principle of 
fundamental justice: (1) the rule must be a “legal principle”; (2) there 
must be a “significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the 
way in which the legal system ought fairly to operate”; and (3) “the rule 
must be capable of being identified with sufficient precision to yield a 
manageable standard”.25 
I have one important quibble with this definition, and that is the re-
quirement of a “societal consensus” as part of element (2). Why should 
that be an element of what is supposed to be a legal test to be applied by 
                                                                                                             
20 R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.). 
21 Hogg, supra, note 2, at ss. 47.11-47.14; Stewart, supra, note 2, at 157-217. 
22 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 
519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]. This issue is now being relitigated on the basis of the 
Court’s subsequent rulings that “overbroad laws” are contrary to fundamental justice: Carter v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012 BCSC 886 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter 
“Carter”] (creating a “constitutional exemption” for assisted suicide when accompanied by 
judicially defined safeguards). 
23 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. 
24 The definition closely followed the one used by Sopinka J. for the majority in Rodriguez, 
supra, note 22, at 590-91. 
25 Malmo-Levine, supra, note 23, at para. 113, per Gonthier and Binnie JJ. 
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judges, and how would the judges ascertain such a phenomenon?26 I 
think it could be said with confidence that there would have been no 
societal consensus on many of the implications of the requirement for a 
mental element of crime, the general effect of which was to make it 
difficult to punish people who had undoubtedly behaved very badly. 
However, it seems likely that the idea of societal consensus is not 
intended to be taken seriously, and judges will decide for themselves 
(and no doubt often disagree) on whether a societal consensus exists for a 
proposed principle of fundamental justice. 
The high-water marks of judicial review under section 7 — along 
with Morgentaler — have been the cases striking down “overbroad” 
laws, “disproportionate” laws and “arbitrary” laws, and I will briefly 
describe each of these categories of cases. 
VI. OVERBROAD LAWS STRUCK DOWN 
In R. v. Heywood,27 the Supreme Court struck down a law on the 
ground that it was “overbroad” — broader than necessary to accomplish 
its purpose. Overbreadth, the Court held, was a breach of the principles 
of fundamental justice, and therefore a basis for a finding of unconstitu-
tionality in a law that affects life, liberty or security of the person. 
The law under challenge in Heywood was a provision of the Crimi-
nal Code that made it an offence of “vagrancy” for a person who had 
previously been found guilty of the offence of sexual assault to be “found 
loitering in or near a schoolground, playground, public park or bathing 
area”. Section 7 was applicable because the law restricted the liberty of 
the convicted sexual offenders to whom it applied. The majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the law was a breach of the principles of 
fundamental justice because it was “overbroad”. Justice Cory, who wrote 
for the majority, acknowledged that a restriction of liberty for the 
purpose of protecting the safety of children would not be a breach of the 
principles of fundamental justice. But a law that restricted liberty more 
than was necessary to accomplish its purpose would be a breach of 
fundamental justice. In this case, the law was overbroad in three respects: 
(1) its geographic scope was too wide because parks and bathing areas 
                                                                                                             
26 Accord, Stewart, supra, note 2, at 108, who however goes on to suggest that the term 
should not be taken too literally: a societal consensus on the general values underlying the 
administration of justice is all that was meant. 
27 [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.); the case is discussed at more length 
in Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 47.15. 
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included some places where children were unlikely to be found; (2) its 
duration was too long because it applied for life with no provision for 
review; and (3) the class of persons to whom it applied was too wide 
because some convicted sex offenders would not be a continuing danger 
to children. The majority pointed out that a person might be a convicted 
sexual offender solely by reason of some drunken episode as a teenager, 
and that a sexual offender might be guilty of vagrancy solely for visiting 
a remote wilderness park. The case before the Court, however, was a 
man who had been recently convicted of sexual assault and who had 
been warned once by the police to stay away from children’s play-
grounds, who was found standing at the edge of a children’s playground 
in Victoria taking pictures of the children with a telephoto lens. The 
photos in his camera and the photos found at his home showed that he 
was taking pictures of young girls with their clothing disarrayed from 
play so that their crotches, although covered by underclothes, were 
visible. The trial judge regarded the behaviour as sufficiently sinister to 
impose a three-month prison sentence followed by three years of proba-
tion. The majority of the Supreme Court could hardly have been indiffer-
ent to the facts of the case, but they struck down the law and acquitted 
the accused entirely on the basis of hypothetical facts involving the most 
innocent possible offenders.28 It is very hard for any law to withstand an 
attack of this kind. 
Overbreadth raises a host of practical and theoretical difficulties. The 
use of hypothetical examples is an important one of those difficulties: it 
has been condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States for 
going beyond the legitimate scope of judicial review.29 But consider the 
other difficulties. The purpose of a law is a judicial construct, which can 
be defined widely or narrowly as the reviewing court sees fit. In this 
case, the Court divided on the question whether the purpose of the law 
was only the protection of children (as the majority held) or the protec-
tion of adults as well (as the minority held). Even if agreement could be 
reached on the purpose of a law, the question whether the law overshoots 
the purpose, raises difficult interpretative questions. In this case, did 
                                                                                                             
28 The hypothetical case of the most innocent possible offender has also been used to strike 
down a minimum mandatory sentence, even when the particular accused’s actual crime justified a 
sentence above the mandatory minimum: R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 
(S.C.C.). Later cases have insisted that the hypotheticals must be reasonable, and have upheld 
minimum mandatory sentences: Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 53.4; but the Court has not disavowed the 
hypothetical technique. 
29 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, at 610-11 (1973), per White J. 
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loitering include mere presence in the prohibited areas (as the majority 
held), or did it involve some element of malevolent intent (as the 
minority held)? And what of the empirical questions of whether sex 
offenders can reliably be cured and whether there are patterns of cross-
over from one kind of sexual assault (for example, against adults) to a 
different kind (for example, against children)? Majority and minority 
disagreed on those questions too. These kinds of disagreements (on 
purpose, on interpretation and on empirical facts) are not unusual among 
judges and are not surprising, but when the judges wield the doctrine of 
overbreadth as a tool of judicial review, it must be recognized that a 
judge who disapproves of a law will always be able to find that it is 
overbroad.30 
The law in Heywood was a direct restraint on the liberty of convicted 
sex offenders, restricting their access to schoolyards, playgrounds, public 
parks and bathing areas. Such laws are unusual. But it must be remem-
bered that any law that carries the possible sanction of imprisonment is 
deemed by the Supreme Court to be a deprivation of liberty requiring 
compliance with section 7.31 And it must also be remembered that a 
corporation, although not itself liable to the sanction of imprisonment, is 
permitted to rely on section 7 as a defence to a criminal charge if the 
defence would be available to an individual.32 The effect of these rules is 
to expose not merely the criminal law, but much regulatory law, to 
section 7 review.33 Any law that includes the sanction of imprisonment is 
unconstitutional if a court determines, relying on hypothetical cases, that 
the scope of the law is broader than is necessary to carry out its purpose. 
After Heywood, constitutional challenges based on overbreadth were 
surprisingly few and uniformly unsuccessful,34 allowing one to wonder 
whether the Supreme Court had repented of its incautious foray into 
overbreadth. However, all doubt was dispelled by the Court’s decision in 
R. v. Demers,35 which demonstrated that the doctrine was still alive and 
well. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down the Criminal Code 
regime for accused persons who were found unfit to stand trial. The 
Court held that the statutory regime — annual hearings by a review 
                                                                                                             
30 The categories of “disproportionate laws” and “arbitrary laws” (discussed in the text that 
follows) which the Court has created since Heywood are open to similar objections. 
31 Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 47.7(a). 
32 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 (S.C.C.). 
33 For example, R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., id. 
34 Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 47.15. 
35 [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Demers”]. 
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board and restrictions on liberty as ordered by the board — was appro-
priate for the accused person who was not permanently unfit to stand 
trial. However, the law was overbroad in its application to the accused 
person who was permanently unfit to stand trial because he or she was 
trapped in the system for so long as the criminal charge remained 
outstanding. The overbreadth led the Court to strike down the entire 
regime. One might have been tempted to accuse the Court itself of 
overbreadth in ordering such a radical remedy for a narrow defect in the 
law. But the Court postponed the declaration of invalidity for 12 months 
to allow time for Parliament to amend the law. Parliament responded by 
enacting an amendment to the regime authorizing a court to order a stay 
of proceedings if the court was satisfied that the accused was not likely 
ever to become fit to stand trial and did not pose a significant threat to 
the safety of the public.36 
The overbreadth doctrine has also been used by the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia to revisit the offence of assisting suicide, narrowly 
upheld by the Supreme of Canada in the Rodriguez case in 199337 — 
before the Court had developed the doctrine of overbreadth. Justice Lynn 
Smith applied the doctrine of overbreadth to create a “constitutional 
exemption” for assisted suicide that took place in compliance with 
judicially defined safeguards.38 
VII. DISPROPORTIONATE LAWS STRUCK DOWN 
In Malmo-Levine,39 the Supreme Court established a new doctrine of 
“disproportionality”, which is a breach of the principles of fundamental 
justice, and therefore a basis for a finding of unconstitutionality in a law 
that affects life, liberty or security of the person. The doctrine of dispro-
portionality, according to the majority of the Court, requires the Court to 
determine: (1) whether the law pursues a “legitimate state interest”; and, 
if it does (2) whether the law is grossly disproportionate to the state 
interest.40 This doctrine does not replace overbreadth — Demers applied 
overbreadth a year later — and, like overbreadth, it is really an authority 
for the Court to undertake a review of the efficacy of the means enacted 
to achieve a legislative objective. 
                                                                                                             
36 S.C. 2005, c. 22, s. 33. 
37 Supra, note 22. 
38 Carter, supra, note 22. 
39 Supra, note 23. 
40 Id., at para. 143. 
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The issue in Malmo-Levine was the criminalization (with the possi-
bility of imprisonment) of the possession of marijuana. The Court 
accordingly asked whether there was a legitimate state interest in the 
prohibition of marijuana use (yes was the answer), and whether the 
prohibition of possession was too extreme a response to that state 
interest. On the latter point, the majority concluded that it was not, so 
that there was no disproportionality and no breach of section 7. Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps, however, dissented, holding that “the harm 
caused by using the criminal law to punish the simple use of marihuana 
far outweighs the benefits that its prohibition can bring”.41 On that basis, 
which is really just a disagreement with the legislative policy with 
respect to marijuana, they would have struck down the law for breach of 
section 7. 
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society42 
was another case arising out of the criminalization of drug use. Insite was 
a safe-injection clinic established under provincial law and located in 
Vancouver. It provided a safe and supervised environment with trained 
staff and clean equipment (but no drugs) to enable drug addicts to inject 
their illegal drugs, mainly heroin and cocaine (which they had to bring 
with them). The clinic was very successful in reducing deaths by over-
dose, reducing injuries from incompetent injections, and reducing the 
spread of infectious disease from shared equipment. The federal Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act43 prohibited, with a penalty of impris-
onment, the possession of proscribed drugs (which included cocaine and 
heroin), and the clinic could not operate if the criminal prohibition were 
applied to it. Initially this problem was solved by the federal Minister of 
Health, who, under section 56 of the Act, had the discretion to grant 
exemptions from the Act “if, in the opinion of the Minister, the exemp-
tion is necessary for a medical or scientific purpose or is otherwise in the 
public interest”. The Minister granted an exemption to Insite on a trial 
basis. After a change of policy by a new federal government, and despite 
the evidence of the benign effects of the clinic, the new Minister refused 
to extend the exemption, which would have forced the closing of the 
clinic. 
                                                                                                             
41 Id., at para. 301, per Deschamps J., at para. 280, per LeBel J. Justice Arbour also dis-
sented, but on the basis of a “harm principle” that she alone found to be a principle of fundamental 
justice. 
42 [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Insite”]. Chief Justice McLachlin 
wrote the opinion of the unanimous Court. 
43 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
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The operator of the Insite clinic and two of its patients brought pro-
ceedings for a declaration that the criminal prohibition of possession 
was, in its application to Insite, an infringement of section 7 of the 
Charter. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act did indeed 
impair the “liberty” of the staff and patients of the clinic (who would all 
be vulnerable to the penalty of imprisonment for possession), as well as 
the “life” and “security of the person” of the patients (who would lose 
their access to a safe venue for injection). However, the Act itself was not 
in breach of the principles of fundamental justice, because the prohibi-
tion of possession was qualified by the power to grant exemptions in 
section 56, which could prevent the Act from applying where its applica-
tion would be “grossly disproportionate” or “arbitrary”.44 In this case, 
however, the Minister had refused to extend the exemption to Insite, 
thereby reimposing the criminal prohibition on the clinic. The Minister’s 
decision to deny the exemption was a denial of the principles of funda-
mental justice because it disregarded the evidence that Insite had saved 
lives and prevented injury and disease without any countervailing 
adverse effects on public safety (or anything else). The effect of the 
Minister’s decision (the closure of Insite) was “grossly disproportionate” 
to any state interest in maintaining an absolute prohibition of possession 
of illegal drugs on Insite’s premises.45 The Minister’s decision was also 
“arbitrary, undermining the very purposes of [the Act], which include 
public health and safety”.46 The Minister was obliged to exercise his 
discretion under section 56 in compliance with section 7, and had failed 
to do so. Since the evidence indicated that there was only one Charter-
compliant choice, the Court ordered the Minister to grant an exemption 
to Insite “forthwith”. 
The Insite case was followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bed-
ford v. Canada (Attorney General),47 which was a constitutional chal-
lenge to the prostitution offences in the Criminal Code. Prostitution itself 
is not a criminal offence, either for the seller or the buyer of sexual 
services; prostitution is therefore a lawful occupation. But it is an offence 
to keep or be found in a “common bawdy house”, which is a place that is 
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at para. 113. The topic of “arbitrary laws” is discussed in the next section of this 
paper. 
45 Id., at para. 136. 
46 Id. 
47 [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]. Justices 
Doherty, Rosenberg and Feldman wrote the majority opinion. Justice MacPherson, with whom 
Cronk J.A. agreed, wrote a partially dissenting opinion. 
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used for “the purpose of prostitution”. And it is an offence to live 
“wholly or in part on the avails of prostitution of another person”. And it 
is an offence to “communicate with any person [in a ‘public place’] for 
the purpose of prostitution”. All three offences carry the penalty of 
imprisonment so that “liberty” is affected. And the Court held that 
“security of the person” was also affected because the Court found that 
each of the three offences had the effect of preventing prostitutes from 
taking sensible precautions to reduce the risk of physical violence to 
which they were subject. The bawdy house offence criminalized the 
practice of prostitution at a fixed indoor location (including the prosti-
tute’s own home) which could include security measures and would in 
any case be safer than the streets. The living-on-the-avails offence 
criminalized the hiring of support and security staff, who could serve 
screening and protective functions. And the communicating offence 
criminalized any attempt by street prostitutes to screen potential custom-
ers by talking to them in a public place before getting into a vehicle or 
going to a private place. The Court saw a parallel with the Insite case, 
where the criminal prohibitions increased the risks to drug addicts by 
denying them a safe venue for injections. Indeed, the prostitutes’ claim 
was even stronger since prostitution, unlike the possession and use of 
illicit drugs, was not an unlawful activity. The Court followed Insite to 
hold unanimously that the bawdy house and living-on-the-avails offences 
were grossly disproportionate to their objectives, and also held that they 
were overbroad in catching benign as well as malign activity.48 In the 
case of the communicating offence,49 the Court divided. Three judges 
(the majority) upheld the communicating offence on the ground that the 
social nuisances caused by street solicitation outweighed any increased 
risk to prostitutes. Two judges would have struck the offence down on 
the ground that the increased risk to prostitutes so outweighed the social 
                                                                                                             
48 In the case of the bawdy house provision, the Court suspended the declaration of invalidi-
ty for 12 months to give Parliament time to enact a Charter-compliant provision, should it wish to do 
so. In the case of the living-on-the-avails provision, the Court read into the provision language to 
clarify that it only applied “in circumstances of exploitation”. 
49 A complication was that the communicating offence had been upheld by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. 
No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.), but the reasons were primarily based on s. 2(b) (freedom of 
expression) rather than on s. 7. The Court of Appeal in Bedford, supra, note 47, regarded itself as 
bound by the s. 2(b) reasoning (at para. 52), but not by the s. 7 reasoning in light of the dramatic 
developments in the s. 7 jurisprudence since 1990 and the evidence in the case relying on those 
developments (at para. 70). The majority did in fact uphold the communicating offence, but the 
minority would have struck down the communicating offence on s. 7 grounds.  
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nuisances caused by street solicitation that the offence was grossly 
disproportionate to its objective. 
VIII. ARBITRARY LAWS STRUCK DOWN 
Finally, there is the doctrine of arbitrariness, which is a third basis for 
a breach of the principles of fundamental justice by a law that affects life, 
liberty or security of the person. As related above, the Court in the Insite 
case relied on a doctrine of arbitrariness as well as disproportionality in 
ordering the Minister of Health to grant the drug injection clinic an 
exemption from the criminal prohibition of possession of narcotics. The 
Court has not yet been able to agree on a definition of arbitrariness, and it 
is not entirely clear whether it is materially different from disproportion-
ality.50 However, in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),51 a majority 
of the Court52 struck down Quebec’s prohibition on the purchase of private 
health-care insurance on the ground of arbitrariness alone. All judges 
agreed that the failure to provide timely health care in the public system 
led to breaches of the right to life (since delays sometimes increased the 
risk of death) and the right to security of the person (since delays 
prolonged pain and stress). So section 7 was engaged. According to 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. for the majority, a law was arbitrary if it 
“lacks a real connection on the facts to the purpose the [law] is said to 
serve”.53 That was the case here because the evidence showed that other 
developed countries with universal public health care plans permitted 
parallel access to private care without injury to the public health system. 
Justices Binnie and LeBel dissented, holding that a parallel private 
system would divert resources from the public system, reducing the 
quality of the public system.54 
                                                                                                             
50 In Malmo-Levine, supra, note 23, above, the majority opinion of Gonthier and Binnie JJ. 
(at paras. 135-183) treated the two ideas separately, while the dissenting opinions of LeBel J. (at 
paras. 277-280) and Deschamps J. (at paras. 289-302) treated disproportionality as the test of 
arbitrariness. In Insite, supra, note 42, McLachlin C.J.C. for the Court (at paras. 129-133) treated the 
two doctrines separately, although holding that both were applicable in that case; she also 
acknowledged (at para. 132) that “the jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled”. 
51 [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). 
52 Id. The seven-judge bench was actually split 3-1-3, with the one being Deschamps J., 
who concurred with McLachlin C.J.C., Major J. and Bastarache J., but on the basis of the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, not the Charter of Rights. However, her 
reasons were very similar to the McLachlin-Major opinion which was based on s. 7 of the Charter. 
53 Id., at para. 134. 
54 The dissenting position is open to the criticism that there would be regulatory solutions to 
the risk of doctors migrating to the more profitable private sector. 
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IX. THIRTY YEARS LATER 
Section 7 is now 30 years old. Who would have imagined that it 
would give authority to judges to strike down laws respecting abortion, 
convicted sex offenders, drug addiction, assisted suicide, prostitution and 
even the single-tier public health care system? These include some of the 
most contested political issues in Canada. These section 7 cases are the 
most dramatic examples of the majoritarian critique of the Charter, 
favoured by Charter critics of both the left and the right, that decries the 
shift of policy-making away from the elected, accountable, legislative 
bodies and officials and over to the unelected and unaccountable 
judges.55 That is certainly what has happened here. 
On the other hand, there is much to like about some of the decisions. 
The doctrines of overbreadth, disproportionality and arbitrariness are all 
at bottom intended to address what Hamish Stewart calls “failures of 
instrumental rationality”,56 by which he means that the Court accepts the 
legislative objective, but scrutinizes the policy instrument enacted as the 
means to achieve the objective. If the policy instrument is not a rational 
means to achieve the objective, then the law is dysfunctional in terms of 
its own objective. A law that restricts life, liberty or security of the 
person, when subjected to an evidence-based review of its operation, 
may be shown to be not in fact fulfilling the law’s objective, or even to 
be undermining the law’s objective by doing more harm than good. That 
was the thrust of the evidence in the abortion, drug addiction, assisted 
suicide, prostitution and health care cases.57 In an ideal world, such 
failures of policy would be remedied by the responsible legislative body. 
But if the persons harmed by the dysfunctional law have little popular 
appeal or political power, then legislators may be uninterested in their 
problems and disinclined to take any action, especially if they believe 
that a remedial law is likely to be unpopular. In that situation, there is a 
case for judicial review of the deprivation of life, liberty or security of 
the unpopular minority. 
It must be remembered too that the majoritarian objection to judicial 
review often exaggerates the undemocratic character of judicial review. 
The fact is that judicial review is rarely the last word in Charter cases: a 
judicial decision striking down a law usually prompts a legislative 
                                                                                                             
55 Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 36.4(b) describes and cites the literature. 
56 Stewart, supra, note 2, at 151. 
57 Heywood, supra, note 27, is an outlier because the majority relied on far-fetched hypo-
thetical examples rather than facts to establish the law’s overbreadth. 
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sequel.58 Judicial review was the last word on abortion, but only because 
a bill introduced after Morgentaler to re-criminalize abortion (but with 
less restrictive conditions) was defeated in a tie vote in the Senate,59 and 
the resulting regulatory vacuum seems to have remained politically 
acceptable. But in most areas of public policy, the Court, driven by the 
facts of a particular case, can make only crude and simple interventions 
in fields that require subtle and complex regulation. Humane policies to 
minimize the harm done by the criminalization of activity caused by drug 
addiction and activity associated with prostitution, the provision of 
safeguards for assisted suicide, and the reduction of long waits for public 
health care, for example, will be complicated, and they have to be 
carefully designed with the assistance of experts and informed by what 
other countries have done, and they must eventually be enacted by 
elected legislative bodies — taking care to avoid the traps that caused 
judicial intervention in the first place. 
But, whatever conclusion one reaches about the desirability of judi-
cial review under section 7, there is no doubt whatever that in the past 30 
years section 7 has achieved much that could not have been anticipated 
by those present at the birth. That is one characteristic of a brilliant 
career. And 30 is still a young age, especially for a Charter right that is 
invulnerable to mandatory retirement or death. So far, the ingenuity of 
the Supreme Court has been devoted to expanding judicial review under 
section 7. That may not continue, of course, but, if it does continue for 
the next 30 years, the career of section 7 will become even more brilliant. 
                                                                                                             
58 Hogg, supra, note 2, at s. 36.5, provides the data that support this statement and describes 
and cites the literature on the topic of “dialogue” between the courts and the legislative branch. 
59 Bill C-43 was passed by the House of Commons but defeated by the Senate on a 43-43 
tie vote at third reading on January 31, 1991. 
